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1957] JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPE 




THE years following the Second World War witnessed a wave of constitution making in Europe. In East and West alike, 
popular government was instituted through new basic laws. But 
whereas the constitutions of Eastern Europe established a Rous-
seauistic form. of democracy through the creation of an omnipotent 
legislature,1 those of the West, while reflecting a belief in parlia-
mentary government, to a larger or smaller degree limited the 
power of the legislature through the introduction of judicial 
review.2 This acceptance of judicial review can be attributed 
mainly to two factors. It sprung from a distrust of a parliamen-
tarism under which, during the previous decades, a Mussolini, a 
Hitler, and a Petain were able to rise to power, and was a conse-
quence of the revival of natural law against the juridical positivism 
of the past generations.3 
To Europeans, judicial review has had a great variety of mean-
ings. A distinction was made between the courts' right to test, in 
a federal state, acts of the authorities of the component member 
states for their compatibility with national law ("federal" judicial 
review), and their right to examine national acts for their constitu-
tionality ("national" judicial review). Second, the examination 
of administrative decrees passed under the authority of a law was 
distinguished from the review of the law itself. Third, a distinction 
has been recognized between the formal and material constitution-
ality of laws, the former being concerned with the question wheth-
er the law·has come about in the prescribed procedure ("extrinsic" 
• Assistant Professor of Political Science, The Johns Hopkins University; LL.B. 1948, 
Dr. Jur. 1949, Heidelberg University, Ph.D. 1952, Princeton University.-Ed. 
1 Constitutions of Albania (1946), art. 37; Yugoslavia (1946), art. 50; Bulgaria (1947), 
art. 15; Rumania (1948), art. 37; East Germany (1949), art. 50. In East Germany, legis-
lative supremacy had already been established under the state constitutions of Thuringia 
(1946), art. 8; Saxony-Anhalt (1947), art. 24; Brandenburg (1947), art. 9; Saxony (1947), 
art. 26; Mecklenburg (1947), art. 22. 
2 Constitutions of France (1946), arts. 91-93; Italy (1947), arts. 134-137; Germany 
(1949), arts. 93-94. In West Germany, judicial review had also been adopted under the 
state constitutions of Wiirttemberg-Baden (1946), art. 92; Bavaria (1946), art. 65; Hesse 
(1946), arts. 131-132; Rhineland-Palatinate (1947), arts. 129, 130, 136; Baden (1947), art. 
114; Wiirttemberg-Hohenzollern (1947), art. 65. 
s See the author's "Natural Law in the Modem European Constitutions," 1 NATURAL 
LAW FORUM 73 (1956). 
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constitutionality), the latter with the compatibility of the content 
of the law with the constitution ("intrinsic" constitutionality). In 
all three groups the first alternative has been as generally accepted 
as the latter has been rejected. 
Dicey's comment that judicial review is a necessary accompani-
ment of federalism proves, as far as most European federations are 
concerned, correct in only a qualified sense.4 The courts do not 
play the role of an umpire between national and state interests, 
but rather protect national law against infringements by the state 
authorities. In Switzerland, the Federal Tribunal can vindicate 
the rights of the citizen under the federal constitution against vio-
lations by cantonal statutes. Judicial review does not extend to 
acts of the Federal Assembly.5 In Imperial Germany a similar 
situation existed under the principle "Reichsrecht has preference 
before Landesrecht."6 The constitutions of Austria of 1920 and 
1929 and the Weimar constitution provided for a broader scope of 
"federal" judicial review by giving greater consideration to the 
state versus the national interests. As a matter of fact, even "na-
tional" judicial review existed under these constitutions,7 but not,. 
however, to the degree that it is accepted in the United States. 
Many European legislatures enact rather general laws and 
authorize administrative officials to issue supplementary provi-
sions and to regulate the details of administration by ordinances. 
As a result, most of the rules and provisions affecting the rights of 
the individual are made by administrative officials. Over these ad-
ministrative acts, a vigorous control is exercised either by special 
administrative courts, or by the ordinary courts. Whenever an ad-
ministrative ordinance is considered to be in excess of the authority 
granted to the administration, it is annulled. Likewise, adminis-
trative acts may be condemned for being unfair or inexpedient. 
The review of the legality of administrative rules and ordinances. 
has, during past generations, been a standing practice in European 
4DICEY, LAW OF nm CONSTITUTION, 8th ed., lxxxviii (1915). 
IS Const., art. 113. See FLEINER-GIACOlllEITI, SCHWEIZERISCHES BUNDESSTAATSRECHT 92-
ff., 103 ff. (1949). 
6 Const., art. 2. See MEYER·ANSCHUETZ, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS, 7th ed., 
715 (1919). Similar art. 13 of the Weimar Const., compare ANSCHUETZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES. 
DEUTSCHEN R.EICHS, 14th ed. (1932). 
7For Austria, see KELsEN, GRUNDRISS DES OESTERREICHISCHEN STAATSRECHTS 214 (1923); 
WrrrMAYER, OESTERREICHISCHES VERFASSUNGSRECHT 22 (1923); EISENMANN, LA JUSTICE CON· 
STITUTIONNELLE Er LA HAUTE CoUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE D'AUTRICHE (1928). For Germany, see-
ANSCHUEIZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN R.EICHS, 14th ed., art. 13, no. 4; art. 70, no. 5. 
(1932). 
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countries.8 Review of the constitutionality of laws, on the other 
hand, was not generally recognized. Consequently, the courts 
seldom became involved in a conflict with the legislative depart-
ment. 
European courts have usually tested the formal constitution-
ality of the laws. This consists of a review of the process of enact-
ment. If it was discovered that the procedural requirements of the 
constitution had not been complied with, the law in question was 
declared void.9 On the other hand, the testing of the content of a 
legislative act for its "intrinsic" constitutionality was the exception 
rather than the rule. 
In the following pages, the term "judicial review" will not be 
used for those variations that have been generally accepted in 
Europe. Rather, the review of material national law will be under-
stood by the term. After discussing the advocacy and excep-
tional existence of this form of judicial review before the Second 
World War, we shall deal with the reasons for its general rejection 
during that period. This survey of the main theoretical aspects of 
judicial review will be followed by a consideration of the practical 
organization and scope of that institution in the years after the war. 
II 
The establishment of judicial review by European constitu-
tions is the consequence of tendencies that had existed since before 
World War I. Even France, the classic example of a government 
by assembly, had advocates of judicial review. It was considered a 
corollary to a written constitution. Writers followed the Hamilton-
Marshall arguments as interpreted by Cooley and Lord Bryce.10 
8 For France, see ALmERT, LE CoNTROLE JURIDICTIONNEL DE L'ADMINISTRATION AU 
M:oYEN DU REcoURS POUR EXCES DE Pouvom (1926); DARESTE, LES VOIES DE REcoURS CONTRE 
LES ACTES DE LA PUISSANCE PUBLIQUE (1914); LAFERRIERE, TRAITE DE LA JURISDICTION AD-
MINISTRATIVE ET DES REcoURS CONTENTIEUX (1896). For Germany, see ANSCHUETZ, DIE VER-
FASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS, 14th ed., art. 70, no. 5; art. 102, no. 5-6 (1932); Jellinek, 
"Der Schutz des oeffentlichen Rechts durch ordentliche und durch Verwaltungsgerichte," 
2 VEROEFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER 8ff. (1925). 
For Italy, see RANELETTI, LEZIONE DI Dmrrro AMMINISTRATIVO (1923-1925); ORLANDO, LA 
GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA (1923). 
9 For France, see HAURIOU, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed., 283 (1929); for 
Germany, ANSCHUETZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES·DEUTSCHEN REICHs, 14th ed., arL 70; KARL-HEINZ 
SEIFERT, DAS RECHT DER GERICHTE, REICHSGESETZE AuF IHRE RECHTSGUELTIGKEIT Zu 'OBER-
PRUEFEN esp. IOI ff., 139 ff. (Diss. Leipzig, 1933); for Italy, 2 PALMA, Dmrrro Cosnro-
ZIONALE, 3d ed., 620-621 (1884); for Switzerland, FLEINER-GIACOMETTI, SCHWEIZERISCHES 
BUNDESSTAATSRECHT 931 (1949). 
10 l BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 242 ff. (1911); COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 5-6, 332 ff. (1927). 
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Constitutional norms, being fundamental laws, are superior to 
statutes, or ordinary laws. The judges, when refusing to enforce 
a statute because of its incompatibility with the constitution, are 
by no means changing the law. They are but the mouthpiece of 
the law, following the will of the people-th~ master-rather than 
that of its servants-the legislators. Judicial review thus conserves 
the popular will as expressed in the constitution. It is the exercise 
of a merely judicial function and does not elevate the judges above 
the other departments of government or the constitution.11 
As to the scope of judicial review, two main tendencies can be 
recognized. One group of jurists, believing in higher law as a 
limitation on the pouvoir constituant, were in favor of a broad 
exercise of judicial review that was oriented toward natural law. 
Other ·writers proceeded more cautiously in fear of too abrupt a 
break with the tradition of the French Revolution. They rejected 
the use of higher law principles and wanted judicial decisions to be 
based on the express provisions of the ·written constitution only. • 
Outstanding representatives of the first group are Thaller, 
Hauriou and Duguit. As early as 1902, Thaller came forward with 
the tp.esis ,that there are unwritten principles which form part of 
the constitution and are entitled to the same respect as written con-
situtional norms. Otherwise the citizen would, in the absence of an 
express and clearly defined protection of a civil right through the 
constitution, be "at the mercy of the la-wmaker who could arbi-
trarily trample upon that right, reduce and annihilate it." Among 
the rights thus protected were even those that "have never been 
expressed and which are revealed to us only through our conscience 
( sens in time)." Therefore the judges, when refusing to apply a 
statute, do so "because their inner conscience tells them that the 
law infringes upon the individual's rights to a degree that is beyond 
what is reasonable and legitimate."12 
Hauriou claimed that the decisions of the Tribunal of Con-
11 See Jeze, "Notions sur le contr6le des deliberations des assemblees deliberantes," 
54 R.EvuE GENERALE D'ADMINISTRATION 31, 154 (1895); Proa!, "Le r6le du pouvoir judi-
ciaire dans les republiques," 56 R.EvuE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 558 (1908). After the 
First World War, the issue of judicial review did not so much turn on the juristic-logical 
question of whether judicial review was a consequence of a written and rigid constitution, 
but rather on the political question of whether· it was likely to check the dangers of 
parliamentarism [See 3 BURDEAU, TRAITE DE SCIENCE PoLITIQUE 346 ff. (1950)]. French 
arguments concerning judicial review thus go parallel to those made in Germany at that 
time. Cf. pp. 556-558 infra. For a discussion of judicial review and for its logical justifi• 
cation in the twenties, see Ho Hlo KY, LE CoNTROLE DE LA CONSTITUTIONNALITE DES LoIS 
EN FRANCE (Diss., Paris, 1926). 
12 31 BULLETIN DE LA SOCIETE DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 249 ff. (1902). 
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flicts of July 30, 1873, and of the Council of State of August 7, 1909 
and March I, 1912, recognized the courts' right to verify the con-
stitutionality of legislative acts.13 Like Thaller an adherent of the 
theory of unwritten constitutional principles, Hauriou derived 
their existence from the nature of law as an organized system. 
Just as the body of private law contains superior principles which 
are applied by the judges irrespective of whether they are or are 
not put down in the civil codes, he argued, in like manner also 
public law contains such principles.14 Therefore, although the 
constitutional laws of 1875 do not expressly confirm the rights of 
man proclaimed in 1789, those rights are part of the superlegalite 
constitutionelle, which is above the written constitution.15 Only 
their acknowledgment gives legitimacy to the written constitution. 
"It is erroneous," Hauriou maintains, "to believe that the con-
stitutional superlegality comprehends only that which is written 
in the Constitution. It comprehends much more, including, for 
instance, all the fundamental principles of government, i.e., the 
principles of civil rights, which form the basis of the state as much 
as the political principles upon which the government is built. 
These principles constitute some sort of constitutional legitimacy 
(legitimite constitutionelle) which is even above the written con-
stitution."16 A statute that is incompatible with this widened con-
cept of the constitution is not binding upon the judge.17 
Duguit's thesis slightly differs from that of his fellow-jurists. 
The originator of the concept of the regle de droit, Duguit comes 
close to Thaller and Hauriou when he believes in a general rule 
of law which is binding upon all positive law. He admired the 
American Supreme Court for reading natural law principles into 
the Constitution when applying such clauses as "due process of 
law," "equal protection of the laws," etc. This constituted in his 
eyes a recognition by the Court of his regle de droit and did by 
no means amount to a government by the judiciary.18 However, 
13 HAURIOU, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed., 282 ff. (1929). For a different 
point of view, see Jcze, "Le controle jurisdictionnel des lois," 41 REvuE DU DRorr Punuc 
409 (1924); BARTHELEMY, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CoNSTITUTIONNEL (1926). See also 
LEBLANC, DU Pouvom DES TRIBUNAUX D'APPRECIER EN FRANCE LA CONSTITUTIONNALITE DES 
LOIS (Diss., Paris, 1924). 
14 HAURIOU, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed., 68 ff. (1929). 
15 "To be sure, the principles of our civil liberties [libertes publiques] are not con-
tained in the written constitution, but they are nevertheless present in the constitutional 
superlegality, which exists even above the written Constitution." PRECIS DE DRorr CoN-
STITUTIONNEL 298 (1923). 
16 Id. at 296. 
17 HAURIOU, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed., 268 ff. (1929). 
18 3 Ducurr, TRAITE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed., 679 (1923). 
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Duguit does not deem it necessary, in order to declare a statute 
unconstitutional, to have recourse to the concept of an unwritten 
constitutionality. In his opinion, the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen of 1789 "is real law which is superior to ordinary 
laws and even ... to constitutional law, from which it is definitely 
to be distinguished."19 Just as the Declaration was supposed to be 
above the constitution of 1791, in like manner it is above the consti-
tution of the Third Republic and can, therefore, ~erve as a cri-
terion for judicial review.20 
The sweeping concessions which were made to the judiciary 
by those who believed in higher law as a guide for the judge were 
denied by the more moderate adherents of judicial review. At a 
meeting of the Societe de Legislation Comparee in 1902, Saleilles 
expressed doubts as to the value of higher law or the vague provi-
sions of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 
as a basis for the exercise of the review of legislative acts by the 
bench.21 Saleilles declared that he would be all in favor of judicial 
review, but only if it were restricted to the testing of legislation 
against rights clearly defined as to content and application by the 
written constitution. He held that it is inadmissible to base the 
unconstitutionality of a law upon its incompatibility with mere 
general principles that are considered absolute law, such as indi-
vidual liberty, cultural liberty, private property, universal suffrage, 
because there is no such thing· as an absolute law in society. 
"If it is admitted that all statutes which regulate the exercise of an 
absolute right that is written in the Constitution can be contested 
by the judiciary," Saleilles stated, "then it is no longer possible 
to have a legislative or an administrative function. This would 
amount to anarchy, provided for by the Constitution itself."22 
Saleilles' insistence upon a clearly defined scope of judicial review 
was shared by many of his colleagues.23 
On the other side of the Rhine, the situation was even more 
19 Id. at 564. 
20 Id. at 567, 673 ff. 
21 31 BULI.ErIN DE LA SoCIETE DE LEGISLATION CoMPAREE 240 ff. (1902). 
22 Id. at 245-246. 
23 For instance, Jeze, "Le contr61e juridictionnel des lois," 41 REvuE DU DRorr Punuc 
421 (1924): "The system of control by the judges of the intrinsic constitutionality of a law 
would pose grave dangers in France if the theory developed by certain modern authors 
of the constitutional character of a great number of general principles, more or less vague, 
were adopted. There exists no law of a social, fiscal, educational, or religious character 
which might not be set aside by astute judges who feel that it suppresses a fundamental 
principle of French law. The aptitude and skill of jurists in justifying every solution is a 
well-known and universal historical phenomenon •..• " 
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encouraging for the adherents of judicial review. Germany not 
being, like France, a country of government by assembly par excel-
lence, judicial review, scarcely advocated in the days of the Em-
pire,24 had friends not only among the makers and commentators 
of the Weimar Constitution, but also among the judges. 
Judicial review was favored by some members of the constitu-
tional convention at Weimar. A student of Gneist,25 Hugo Preuss, 
often called the father of the Weimar Constitution, was of the 
opinion that judicial review would prevail unless it was specifically 
excluded. He, a Democrat, was supported by Diiringer of the 
German National Party, Cohn and Katzenstein of the Social Demo-
crats. Richterliches Prufungsrecht had thus adherents in all major 
parties. However, no provision establishing judicial review was 
inserted into the Constitution.26 Nevertheless, instead of continu-
ing the Imperial practice of rejecting the right of the judges to test 
laws for their constitutionality, more and more theorists main-
tained that such a right did exist.27 More important still, judicial 
review was actually exercised by the judges. 
One of the most vigorous assertions of the principle was a 
declaration of the Judges' Association of the National Supreme 
Court (Reichsgericht) on January 5, 1924.28 In a decision of No-
vember 28, 1923 the Reichsgericht had stated that the revaluation 
of mortgages was imperative as a matter of good faith.29 Here the 
court tried to remedy one of the many hardships which had come 
about through the inflation and had not yet been mitigated by the 
legislature. At once the German government announced its inten-
tion to prohibit the revaluation through law. Protesting against 
this plan, the Judges' Association declared that the idea of "good 
faith (Treu und Glauben) is beyond the particular statute, and 
beyond a specific positive norm. No legal order which deserves 
that name can exist without recognition of the principle of good 
faith. Therefore the lawmaker is not permitted to thwart, through 
an arbitrary exercise of power, a decision which is imperatively 
required by the principles of good faith." The Judges' Association 
24 See MEYER-ANSCHUETZ, LEHrulUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS, 7th ed., 739 ff. (1919); 
ANSCHUE'IZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS, 14th ed., art. 70, no. 4 (1932). 
25 See GNEIST, DER RECHTSSTAAT UND DIE VERWALTUNGSGERICHTE IN DEUTSCHLAND (1872). 
26 BERICHTE UND PROTOKOLLE DES ACHTEN AUSSCHUSSES 'OBER DEN ENTWURF EINER 
VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS 483 ff. (1920). 
27 See Triepel, "Der Weg der Gesetzgebung nach der neuen Reichsverfassung," 39 
ARCHIV DES OEFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 456 ff., 536 (1920). For other jurists in favor of 
judicial review, see notes 40 and 41 infra. 
28 See 53 JURISTISCHE WoCHENSCHRilT 90 (1924). 
29 Id. at 38 ff. 
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then warned the government that such an arbitrary exercise of 
legislative power would be considered as "an infringement upon 
the principle of good faith, as immoral ( unsittlich) because of its 
immoral consequences, as an unconstitutional expropriation" 
which was void and would not be applied by the judges.30 
This constitutes the assertion of a broad scope of judicial re-
view. Not only do the judges claim a right to test national laws 
for their constitutionality, but also for their compatibility with 
supra-positive law, like the principle of good faith. This far-
reaching claim can be attributed to the fact that during the in-
flation many laws were passed which gave rise to doubts as to 
whether Germany was still a Rechtsstaat.31 As one author put it, 
the state of emergency laws of the war had developed into a state 
of the emergency of the law.32 Small wonder that those who by 
their very calling were the guardians of justice should rally forth 
to protect the Recht against the Gesetz, what they considered right 
against what appeared as a fraudulent legality of the statute. 
However, such a broad concept of judicial review was to play a 
minor role in actual judicial practice. Since the right to test legis-
lative acts was not generally recognized in Imperial Germany, the 
judges, under the Weimar regime, were reluctant to give it too 
broad a scope. Consequently their decisions, while sometimes in-
dicating a belief in supra-positive law, usually just tested statutes 
for their compatibility with the constitution. 
In a decision of December 8, 1923, the Reichsgericht, being 
concerned with the validity of an ordinance, stated obiter dictum, 
"it is recognized that the courts are in principle authorized to 
30Id. at 90. 
31 Stahl, who can probably be considered the originator of this specifically German 
concept of constitutionalism, defined Rechtsstaat this way: "That the state shall be gov-
erned by law [soil Rechtsstaat sein] is the watchword, and is in truth also the trend of 
modem development. The state shall exactly define through law (in der Weise des 
Rechts), and guarantee against violation, the paths and limits of its own activity as well 
as the sphere of freedom of its citizens, and shall therefore enforce moral ideas for reasons 
of its, own only to the extent that they fall within the sphere of law, that is only to the 
most necessary extent. This is the true concept of the Rechtsstaat and not that the only 
function of the state is the administration of the legal order without administrative aims, 
or that it should merely protect the rights of the individual, for the term does not refer 
to the aim and substance of the state, but only to the ways and means through which 
they are to be realized." STAHL, DIE STAATSLEHRE UND DIE PRINZIPIEN DES STAATSRECHTS, lid 
ed., 137 (1856). On the concept of tile Rechtsstaat, see also BAEHR, DER REc:HTSsTAAT 
(1864); GNEIST, DER RECHTSSTAAT UND DIE VERWALTUNGSGERICHTE IN DEUTSCHLAND (1872); 
JELLINEK, VERWALTUNGSRECHT, lid ed., §§5, 12, 13, 14 (1931). The latter work contains a 
detailed bibliography. 
32 Goldschmidt, "Gesetzesdammerung," 53 JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 245 (1924). 
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examine the formal and material validity of laws."33 In the follow-
ing months, the courts mainly tested the validity of ordinances,34 
but on November 4, 1925, the Reichsgericht came forth with an 
unequivocal assertion of the judges' right to pass upon the consti-
tutionality of national statutes.35 The case involved the Revalua-
tion Law of 1925.36 The court, after pointing out that the provi-
sions of the Revaluation Law could be applied only if there were 
no valid arguments against their constitutionality, stated that, in 
view of the attacks against- the legal ·validity of the law by the pub-
lic, it was imperative to test the law for its constitutionality. Al-
though, the court continued, under the constitution the judges 
are subject to the law they can deny the validity of a national law 
to the extent to which it conflicts with superior rules of law. For 
instance, "if a statute contradicts ... the provisions of the national 
Constitution, ... these provisions remain obligatory for the judge 
even against the norms of a subsequent national statute . . . and 
they compel the judge not to apply the norms of the statute."37 
The court then follows Preuss' argument and states that "since the 
... constitution contains no provision denying the right to review 
national laws for their constitutionality or vesting that right in 
some other branch of government, the right and obligation of the 
judge to review legislative acts must be recognized."38 This de-
cision was a green light for other German courts, and in the last 
years of the Weimar Republic judicial review became more and 
more accepted by the judiciary.39 
33 RGZ. 107, 379. For a discussion of this decision, see MATTERN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC 597 ff. (1928). For former decisions dealing with 
the problem of judicial review, see RGSt. 56, 177; RGZ. 102, 164; KG. Nov. I, 1921; 
Reichsfinanzhof 5, 333, and 7, 97. [German cases are quoted by giving the initials of the 
court (RG. for Reichsgericht, KG. for Kammergericht, OVG. for Oberverwaltungsgericht) 
or the name of the court first, and the date of the decision next. To the initials of the 
Reichsgericht are added Z in civil cases (Zivilsachen), or St. in criminal cases (Strafsachen). 
The decisions of the Reichsgericht are quoted by volume and page, as above, or by date.] 
84 Reichsgericht decisions of Jan. 25, 1924; March I, 1924. For a discussion of these 
decisions, see MATTERN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC 
599 ff. (1928). The Staatsgerichtshof dealt with the question of the constitutionality of a 
national law in a decision of June 30, 1923. See MATTERN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC 604 ff. (1928). 
35 RGZ. Ill, 320. For a discussion of this decision see Friedrich, "The Issue of Judicial 
Review in Germany," 43 PoL. SCI. Q. 188 at 196 (1928). 
861 REICHSGESETZBLATI 117. 
37 RGZ. Ill, 320 at 322-323. 
SB Id. at 323. 
39 See Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht Miinchen, March 20, 1926, 31 DEUTSCHE 
JURISTENZEITUNG 903 (1926); REICHSFINANZHOF, Dec. 7, 1926, 32 DEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 
232 (1927); OVG., Hamburg, Jan. 17, 1927, 56 JURISTISCHE WOCHENsCHRIFr 1288 (1927). 
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Concluding we may say that in both France and Germany 
there existed, before the Second World War, tendencies toward 
the acceptance of judicial review. But whereas in France, due to 
· the tradition of legislative supremacy, the advocates of judicial 
review could be found mainly among theorists, in Germany, 
judicial review became also accepted by the judges. Its adherents 
can, in both countries, be classified into two groups. Those who 
believe in specific constitutional provisions as the only criterion 
for the review of statutes can be distinguished from those who, be-
sides, admit natural or supra-positive law as a guide for the judge. 
Among the former were Jalabert and Saleilles in France, Biihler, 
Nawiasky in Germany, to mention only a few.40 Among the advo-
cates of the broader concept of judicial review, France had a 
Thaller, Hauriou, Duguit, just as Germany had a Goldschmidt, 
von Bieberstein and von Hippel.41 Thus the extension of the' 
concept of judicial review seems to follow as naturally from the 
acceptance of that concept as does the advocacy of a constitution-
oriented judicial review from the fear of legislative supremacy. 
The discussion on judicial review before the Second World 
War was not confined to France and Germany, but can be noticed 
in other European countries. It existed in Greece, Norway and 
Rumania, where judicial review was actually practiced, as well as 
in states where the judges did not have the right to review legis-
lative acts, such as Belgium and Switzerland.42 
III 
Numerous as the advocates of judicial review were in Europe 
before the Second World War, they formed a minority. What may 
be considered the fons et origo of judicial review, namely, Lord 
Coke's dictum of 1610 in Dr. Bonham's Case, that "the common 
law will control Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them 
40 BUEHLER, DIE RE!CHSVERFASSUNG 82 (1920), and "Sind die ordentlichen Gerichte 
verpflichtet, verfassungswidrige Gesetze anzuwenden?" 26 DEUTSCHE JURJSTENZEITUNG 
580 (1921); Miigel, "Die Rechtsgiiltigkeit des Aufwertungsgesetzes," 31 DEU'ISCHE JURISTEN-
ZEITUNG 11 (1926); NAWIASKY, BAYERISCHES VERFASSUNGSRECHT 368 ff. (1923), and "Zur 
Frage des richterlichen Priifungsrechts," 28 DEU'ISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 40 (1923). 
41 MARSCHALL VON BIEBERSTEIN, VoM KAMPF DES RECHTES GEGEN DIE GESETZE (1927); 
Goldschmidt, "Gesetzesdiimmerung," 53 JURISTISCHE WocHENSCHRIFT 245 (1924); Kaufmann, 
"Die Verfassungswidrigkeit des §46 des Gesetzes fiber die Reichsfinanzvenvaltung," 48 
JURISTISCHE WocHENSCHRIFT 901 (1919), also Kaufmann's remarks at the fourth meeting of 
the Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, 31 DEU'ISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 653 
(1926); Hippel, "Ober die Verbindlichkeit der Gesetze," 18 ARCHIV DES OEFFENTLICHEN 
REcHTS, Neue Folge 86 (1930). 
42 For judicial review in these various countries, see DESFOUGERES, LE CoNTROLE Ju-
DICIAIRE DE LA_ CONSTITUTIONNALITE DES LOIS 66 ff., 105 ff. (1913). 
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to be utterly void" as "against Common Right and Reason,"43 
achieved only a certain amount of political currency during the 
seventeenth century. English judges were reluctant to venture to 
declare an act of Parliament void and proceeded according to the 
principle laid down by Blackstone, that "the power of parliament 
is absolute and without control."44 Legislative supremacy, as much 
overlooked by Montesquieu as it was condemned by the American 
colonists, was the outstanding feature of English government. It 
was to become the main characteristic of most governments on the 
continent. As in England, the law, being the product of what 
Locke considered the most important branch of government, name-
ly the legislature, was conceived of as the bulwark against a cabinet 
justice that had often appeared as gross injustice. Consequently, 
there developed a general esteem for the legislature, and a move-
ment for codification of the law swept the continent, led by the 
Napoleonic legislation.45 In the ensuing period of juridical pos-
itivism judges became mere technicians who were content with 
interpreting the letter of the law and accepted everything presented 
by the legislature at face value.46 
This development marks indeed a contrast to that of the United 
States. Here the idea of Coke played an important role on the eve 
of the Revolution. James Qtis invoked Coke's dictum in the 
Writs of Assistance Case.41 Other advocates of the colonial cause 
voiced similar sentiments. The majority of the constitutional con-
vention at Philadelphia accepted judicial review.48 For the preser-
vation of free government, judicial review was read into the Con-
stitution by the authors of the Constitution's classic commentary, 
the Federalist.49 And after the young Republic had recovered from 
its critical period, John Marshall declared a law of Congress void 
43 8 CoKE's REP. 107 at 118 (1610). 
441 CoOLEY'S BLACKSTONE, 2d ed., 159 (1872). 
45 See, in that connection, Savigny's famous warning against codification, VoM BERUF 
UNSERER ZEIT FUER GESETZCEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1814), and his "Stimmen fiir 
und wider neue Gesetzbiicher," 3 ZEITSCHRJFT FUER GESCHICHTLICHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 
No. I (1816). 
46 Very characteristic of the positivism of that time is the statement of the French 
jurist Bugnet (1794-1886): "I do not know of any civil law; what I teach is only the Code 
Napoleon." (Quoted by BoNNECASE, L'EcoLE DE L'EXEGESE EN DROIT CIVIL, 2d ed., 128 
(1924). Representatives of the positivist "ecole de l'exegese" were Carre de Malberg, G. 
Jeze, M. Waline, G. Ripert, V. J. Basdevant. In Germany, juridical positivism was rep-
resented by Laband, Georg Jellinek, Hans Kelsen; in Italy, by De Ruggiero, Pacchioni, 
Orlando, Santi Romano. 
47 Quincy's Mass. Rep. 469-485 (1761). 
48 See CoRWIN, THE DOCI'RINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1914). 
49 See the author's THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (Diss., Princeton, 1952). 
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because it conflicted with the Constitution.50 Judicial review thus 
became a generally accepted American practice. Although its 
exercise was often resented by the public and by such powerful 
men as Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt,51 
it was soon considered, "together with its juristic product, a body 
of 'constitutional law,' ... the most distinctive feature of the Amer-
ican constitutional system."52 
We may thus say that the acceptance of judicial review is as 
much part of the American tradition as its rejection is character-
istic for the constitutional development of European nations. 
Hatschek noted at the beginning of the century that the European 
judge was to the core convinced of the supremacy of the legisla-
ture.53 In the mid-twenties, Thoma was still expressing the prev-
alent view when he wrote: "Non-exercise of judicial review has 
been the traditional practice which was-who could deny it?-from 
the point of view of the administration of justice (]ustiz) absolutely 
satisfactory. . .. Non-exercise of judicial review ... is German, 
even European tradition and certainly causa favorabilis."54 Why 
this great difference between America and Europe? Historical, 
juristic and political reasons account for it. 
To the American colonists, acts of Parliament often appeared 
oppressive. As a result, resistance developed against the English 
legislature. After the colonies had become independent their new 
constitutions provided, as a reaction against the strong executive 
under the royal charters, for a concentration of power in the legis-
501 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803). 
51 See Jefferson's letter to W. H. Torrance of June 11, 1815, 14 THE WRlTINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON (Mem. ed. 1903), 302-306; Jackson's veto, in 1832, of the Bank of the 
United States, J. D. RICHARDSON, comp .• 2 COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS 582 (1907); Lincoln's opinion on the Dred Scott decision, 2 WORKS (Fed-
eral ed. 1905), 291 ff.; Roosevelt's "Fireside Chat on the Reorganization of the Judiciary" 
of March 9, 1937, 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 122 ff. 
(1941). 
52 Corwin, "Judicial Review," 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 457 (1932). 
53 1 ENGLISCHES STAATSRECHT 140 (1950). 
54 Thoma, "Das richterliche Priifungsrecht," 43 ARCHIV DES OEFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 
267 at 274 (1922). For similar statements, see Larnaude, "Etudes sur les garanties judi-
ciaires qui existent dans certains pays au profit des particuliers contre les actes du 
pouvoir legislatif," 31 BULI.ETIN DE LA SOCIEI'E DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE 175 at 227 
(1902): "Such legislature with a limited capacity is incompatible with our tradi-
tional conception of this supreme organ of sovereignty." Jean Signore! said: "With 
our temperament and our ideas on popular sovereignty, we would never tolerate a single 
assembly, composed of eight or ten judges having the power to hold in check the will of 
the Legislature, or, in other words, that. of the nation." 40 REVUE PoLmQUE ET PARLE-
MENTAIRE 534 (1904). Duguit declared: "French jurisprudence has never admitted, nor 
will it admit today, that French courts may refuse to apply a law because of its unconsti-
tutionality." 3 TRAITE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 2d ed., 670 (1923). 
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lature. Again, many of the state laws, reflecting the will of a sheer 
majority, infringed upon the vested rights of the individual; again, 
the lawmaker appeared as oppressor. Advocacy of judicial review, 
as a check upon the legislature, seemed as natural with Hamilton as 
it had been with James Otis. The situation was quite different in 
Europe. Here, the absolute ruler was considered the oppressor. 
The courts, having been for the most part subservient to the king, 
had no chance of being considered the liberators of the people. 
That role fell to those who established representative government 
and their favorite instrument, the legislature. 
In France, for instance, the king under the ancien regime was 
the realm's chief administrator. Through his power to promulgate 
edicts and ordinances, he exercised the superior legislative func-
tion. Finally, he rendered justice in all cases he pleased to invoke 
in his council. After the monarchy had been overthrown by the 
Revolution the people, used to governmental omnipotence, trans-
ferred the sovereignty that had rested in the prince to their repre-
sentatives. Although the separation of powers had been proclaimed 
as a criterion for constitutionalism,55 no steps were actually taken 
to restrict the power of the government or to insure the protection 
of the individual's rights. In theory, sovereignty had passed from 
the king to the people; in practice, it was in the Assembly. 
The revolutionaries felt no inclination to permit the courts to 
control legislative acts. They had not forgotten how the old courts 
had abused their right of "verification et remontrances," how the 
judiciary had, in the last years of the ancien regime, been opposed 
to the reforms that were intended by the king. Besides, the judges 
had the reputation of being opposed to the revolutionary ideas. 
Consequently, judicial review was prohibited in many of the laws 
that were adopted in the years after the Revolution,56 and the 
Court of Cassation made sure that these provisions were abided by. 
This did not change after the fall of the Empire, in the days of 
the Monarchy of July, the Second Republic.57 In the Second Em-
pire, the Senate was the guardian of the constitution.58 The third 
55 Compare art. 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of Aug. 26, 
1789: "Any society, in which the enforcement of rights is not guaranteed and the separa-
tion of powers not definitely stated, does not possess a Constitution." 
56 Law of August 16-24, 1790, arts. IO and 11; Constitution of September 3, 1791, title 
Ill, chapter 5, art. 3; Constitution of 5 fructidor, year III, art. 203; Penal Code (Code 
penal), art. 127. 
57 See DESFOUGERFS, CONTROLE JUDICIAIRE DE LA CoNSTITUTIONNALITE DES LOIS 94 ff. 
(1903); Ho HIO KY, LE CONTROLE DE LA CONSTITUTIONNALITE DES LOIS EN FRANCE 135 (Diss., 
Paris, 1926). 
li8 Art. 9 of the Law upon the Organization of the Senate of February 24, 1875. 
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Republic thus inherited a constitutional tradition that denied the 
exercise of judicial review. 
The situation was similar in Germany. In the ]ustizstaat under 
the First Reich, the police power of the prince (ius politiae) was 
restricted by the vested rights (iura quaesita) of the subjects. In 
spite of a rather intricate procedure, the Reich courts often suc-
ceeded in protecting the individual from the government. How-
ever, not all princes would subject themselves to the verdicts of the 
Reich courts, which resulted in a decrease of the judges' prestige. 
Under the subsequent Polizeistaat of the eighteenth century, the 
courts had lost their independence and were considered as a means 
of cabinet justice.59 The fight against absolutism was primarily 
fought for the supremacy of the law that was made not by the 
prince alone, but also by the representatives of the people. The 
ensuing independence of the judiciary was an independence which 
existed under the law made by the legislature, not one above that 
law. The ordinary courts at first and later the administrative 
courts could test the legality of administrative acts (Gesetzmassig-
keit der V erwaltung). They were not supposed to test legislation 
itself for its constitutionality. Rechtsstaat meant the protection of 
the citizen from the executive through the legislature and judi-
ciary, but it did not imply a protection from the lawmaker through 
the judges.60 
In Italy, diverse forms of cabinet-justice existed in the com-
ponent states until the Napoleonic invasion brought the ideas ·of 
the French Revolution to that country between 1796 and 1815. 
The French legal codes were considered by the Italian masses as 
documents which brought about liberation from the arbitrary 
government of the princes, the aristocratic cliques and the judges 
who were in their service. The defeat of Napoleon resulted in a 
temporary comeback of the ousted rulers, but could not quell the 
Italians' yearning for a rule of law and their participation in the 
law-making process. As a concession to the liberal spirit which 
swept over Piedmont as well as over the rest of Europe, the king 
of Piedmont in 1848 granted a written constitution. It was 
modeled along the lines of the Belgian constitution of 1831, vest-
ing legislative power in the representatives of the people, and 
subjecting the executive and the judiciary to the law. With the 
unification of the country, the Statuto of Piedmont became the 
69 See JELLINEK, VERWALTUNGSRECHT, 3d ed., §5 (1931). 
60 See the literature cited in note 31 supra. 
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Italian constitution. In the following years, the Italians adopted 
the German concept of the Rechtsstaat. The public authority 
was, for the sake of the individual, restricted by a system of norms 
that were made by the law-maker. These norms were not only 
binding upon the administration, but also upon the courts. The 
judges had no right to question their validity.61 
The juristic arguments against judicial review correspond to 
the traditional acceptance of legislative power. In general, they 
-consisted in the refutation of the official American doctrine, as 
laid down in Federalist, No. 78, and in Marbury v. Madison.62 
This doctrine was based on the following reasons: first, the quality 
-0f the constitution as superior, and that of the statute as inferior 
law; second, that judicial review followed logically from the prin-
dple of the separation of powers; and third, that the judges, by 
their very learning and calling, were the natural interpreters of 
the law and had therefore to decide whether there existed a con-
flict between constitution and statute. 
In the United States, the exceptional rejection of the principle 
lex posterior derogat priori was justified through the principle 
lex superior derogat inf eriori. In Europe, no distinction between 
a superior constitutional and an inferior ordinary law was gen-
erally recognized. For Esmein, "the constitution does not create 
the state which is already existing as a natural result of the forma-
tion of the nation, but simply determines the form of the state 
and the government. It is a law like other laws." Calling the 
greater stability of constitutional provisions artificial, Esmein 
goes on to say that, as compared with ordinary laws, constitutional 
laws are "simply (solely) more important and more difficult to 
establish and to change," and denies their superior quality.63 He 
then goes on to advocate that the amending power be vested in the 
61 The outstanding pioneer for the Rechtsstaat in Italy was V. E. Orlando. See his 
PRIMO TRATrATO COMPL'ET0 DI DIRrIT0 AMMINISTRATIV0 (1900), and his later work, I Crun:ru 
TECNICI PER LA R!COSTRUZIONE GIURIDICA DEL DIRrITo PUBBLICO (1925). s. Romano, 
L'ORDINAMllNTO Grurumco (1902) was also important for the institution of the Rechtsstaat 
in Italy. A decade later, O. Raneletti gave to the Rechtsstaat a clear juristic form. He 
-established the thesis: "In the modem state the law stands above all other activities; 
everything, including the state itself, must remain subject to the law, and must live and 
operate according to its norms. The state, inasmuch as it subjects itself to the law and 
guarantees its enforcement even with respect to itself, by means of appropriate measures, 
is a State governed by law [Stato di diritto]." PRINCIPII DI DIRITrO AMMINISTRATIV0 142 
(1912). For a discussion of the development of the concept of Rechtsstaat in Italy, see 
Caristia, "Ventura e avventure di una formula: Rechtsstaat," R!VISTA DI DIRITrO Punnuco 
!188 (19!14). 
62 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 1!17 (180!1). For a conventional statement of the doctrine, see 
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 at 544 (192!1). 
63 1 ELEMENTS DE DR0IT CoNSTITUTIONNEL, 7th ed., 412-41!1 (1921). 
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representative branch of government, i.e., the legislature. Thus 
an outstanding authority on French constitutional law supports the 
view that in the constituent act the constituent power (pouvoir 
constituant) is being transferred to a constituted power ( pouvoir 
constitue ), namely, the legislature. The competence of the ordi-
nary lawmaker to amend the constitution meant the elimination 
of the distinction between superior constitutional and inferior 
ordinary law and deprived the doctrine of judicial review of its 
main foundation. 
Esmein's theory, so complementary to the French concept of 
government by assembly, not only became the accepted doctrine 
in France; in Italy also, under the Albertian Statute, it was accepted 
in theory as well as in practice.64 In Germany, the opponents of 
judicial review originally followed mainly the doctrine of Laband: 
the promulgation of the law by the Kaiser did not only create a 
praesumptio iuris, but a praesumptio iuris et de iure for the le-
gality and authenticity of the law, and, thus, precluded judicial 
review.65 Although this doctrine was in principle taken over by 
the commentators on the Weimar constitution, their leading 
figure, Anschutz, based his rejection of judicial review mainly upon 
the fact that under Article 76 of that constitution "the constitu-
tion may be amended by way of legislation." From this he con-
cluded that "the constitution and the statute are manifestations of 
the will of the very same power, the legislative power."66 Con-
sequently, a constitutional provision could not be superior to that 
of an ordinary law. 
In America, judicial review is considered a corollary to the 
64 See 2 PALMA, DIRITro Cosrrruz10NALE, 3d ed., 620-621 (1884): "In Italy, whatever 
may be thought theoretically of the American system, it is certain that judges do not pos• 
sess the same powers as those vested in that [American] Supreme Court. We have already 
noted that the power to change statutory provisions as the need arises, and therefore [the 
power to change] even the so-called constitutional provisions, is always alive and vested in 
the legislative organs of the state; certainly the power to interpret the constitution must 
belong to them. A power, such as the mentioned power of American judges, if 
vested in our judges, would immobilize our Constitution and would hinder its legal de-
velopment according to the evolution of the national conscience; it would prevent legiti-
mate activities of the legislative branch of the Government and it would tum a few judges, 
appointed by the king and a minister and whose duty it is to adjudicate according to law 
and not to pass judgment on the law, into censors of the Parliament; it would confer 
upon them, rather than on the legislative branch, the status of superior organ of the 
state, and of the state's needs, interests and rights. Such a pretension would be com-
pletely unconstitutional in Italy." 
65 2 LABAND, DAS STAATSRECHT DES DEUTSCHEN R.EICHES 43 ff. (1878). See also MEYER• 
ANSCHUETZ, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS, 7th ed., 740 (1919). 
66Dra VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN R.EICHS, 14th ed., art. 76, no. I. See also art. 102, 
nos. 3-4 (1932). 
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principle of the separation of powers. In Europe, judicial review 
was generally thought to involve confusion of powers and to be 
incompatible with that principle. In many instances, the argu-
ments of European jurists follow those of Justice Gibson in his 
famous answer to Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison.61 
According to Signore!, the main objection by the French to judicial 
review is their version of the separation of powers. Judicial re-
view was "contrary ... to the spirit of our legislation," he says, 
and incompatible with the idea of the government of law which 
implied a government of the lawmaker.68 As Esmein put it, the 
judges' function "is to apply, but not to test the laws, which is to 
say that they are competent to apply and interpret ordinary laws, 
but that they have no competency whatsoever to apply and in-
terpret the constitution," something that is preserved to the 
pouvoir constituant, namely, the legislature.69 Judicial review, 
stated a decision of the Belgian Court of Cassation, "would amount 
to an abolition of legislative power and the principle of the separa-
tion of powers . . . [ under which] the legislative power has to 
make the laws, the judicial power has to apply them, and the execu-
tive power has to execute them."70 The Swiss Bluntschli stated 
that if the judges had the right to test legislative acts, then every 
official whose duty it was to apply the law had such a right.71 
Finally the German Laband developed Bluntschli's argument and 
invoked the reductio ad absurdum by implying that not only those 
who applied the law, but also all those who were living under the 
law would, in case of an admission of judicial review, have a right 
to test the validity of legislation. This did not just amount to a 
confusion of powers, but to a confusion of the laws, an anarchy.72 
American advocates of judicial review, following what they be-
lieved to be the reasoning of Hamilton in the Federalist, consistent-
ly insisted that judicial review does not involve a supremacy of the 
judiciary. Naturally, Europeans did not agree with them. As a 
matter of fact, a more careful study of Federalist, No. 78 reveals 
that a superiority of the courts over the legislature was actually 
67 Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sug. &: R. (Pa.) 330 (1825). 
68 "Le controle du pouvoir legislatif," 40 REvuE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 77, 
519, 525 (1904). Cf. Larnaude, "L'inconstitutionnalite des lois et le droit public fran!,3.is,'' 
126 REvuE POLITIQUE ET PARLEMENTAIRE 181 (1926). 
69 ELEMENTS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 7th ed., 592 (1921). 
70 Quoted and discussed in DESFOUGERES, CONTROLE JUDICIAIRE DE LA CONSTITUTION-
NALITE DES LoIS 104 (1903). 
71 BLUNTSCHLI, .Al.LGEMEINES STAATSRECHT 133, n. 2 (1876). 
72 2 I.ABAND, DAS STAATSRECHT DES DEUTSCHEN REICHES 44-45 (1878). 
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admitted by Hamilton.73 On this score, European jurists tend to 
agree wholeheartedly. Esmein's "grave objection" against the 
American system, that it amounted to "an elevation of the judicial 
over the legislative power,"74 expressed the view of the majority 
of European jurists in the decades preceding World War II. Not 
many doubts were raised as to the qualification of the judges to 
interpret the laws. However, there can be noticed, in connection 
with statements maintaining that judicial review establishes 
judicial supremacy, an apprehension lest the judges deviate from 
their duty of impartiality and become motivated by political con-
siderations. "Judges are men," said Signore!, and "the power to 
pass on the validity of laws . . . is . . . a very dangerous weapon 
... for an active participation in the field of politics where they 
could lose a great deal of their authority, prestige, and independ-
ence." Maintaining that in a democracy it is necessary that the 
courts be strong and respected, and the judges honored for their 
professional attainments, their moderation of desires and ambi-
tions, independence of character, their firmness behind their 
opinions; and their pride of spirit, Signore! warned that "these 
qualities were in danger of being sacrificed if the judge were 
charged with the duty to examine the laws for their validity, be-
cause it would . . . almost always involve him in political 
questions. " 75 
This takes us, finally, to the political considerations against 
judicial review. Esmein's statement of the preceding paragraph 
is followed by the apprehensive thought that the acceptance of 
judicial review would amount to the transformation of the judici-
ary into a political department which was "superior to all others,. 
superior even to the will of the nation as manifested in the forms 
of representative government."76 According to Kelsen, such a 
court would be nothing but a legislative body.77 This was of little 
attraction for most Europeans. Larnaude rejected it on the ground 
that it was a "hybrid body, half-judicial, half-legislative," under 
73 He called the judiciary "an intermediate body between the people and the legis-
lature" which had the function "to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their 
authority." If the people, as he also maintains, are superior to the legislature, and the-
courts stand between the people and the legislature, the courts must be as superior to the-
legislature as they are inferior to the people. , 
74 ELEMENTS DE DROIT CoNSTITUTIONNEL, 7th ed., 589 (1921). 
75 "Le controle du pouvoir legislatif," 40 REvuE POLITIQUE Er PARLEMENTAIRE 535-
536 (1904). 
76 ELEMENTS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, 7th ed., 589 (1921). 
77 In ANNUAIRE DE L 'INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PUBLIC 94 (1929) and "La-
garantie juridictionnelle de Ia constitution," 45 REvuE DU DROIT PUBLIC 197 ff. (1928)-
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which "justice would be lost and nothing gained by politics or 
legislation."78 Charmont added that a decision of a judge acting 
as a law maker "will always appear individual, arbitrary, and par-
tial."79 All these statements indicate doubts with regard to the 
ability of the judges to understand current issues and problems. 
This fear was to a large degree based upon the attitude of the 
American Supreme Court which appeared to many Europeans as 
ultra-conservative and reactionary. Edouard Lambert, comment-
ing on the methods that were used by the Supreme Court to secure 
Justice Sutherland's ideal of a "tempered democracy," regretted 
that the Court engrafted upon the original Constitution an eco-
nomic-judicial constitution.80 Hugo Preuss stated that his plan to 
provide for judicial review in the Weimar constitution was 
opposed by the Social Democrats mainly because they were horri-
fied by the "notorious practice of the United States Supreme 
Court."81 The fear of a reactionary judiciary was also based upon 
the fact that the judges were traditionally recruited from the more 
conservative strata of society. A reactionary judiciary, empowered 
to check the acts of a progressive legislature, it was feared, would 
provoke revolutionary movements with resultant instability.82 
Finally, judicial review was opposed on the ground that it 
created legal disunity and insecurity. If all the courts would have 
the right to review legislative acts, it was argued, the unity of the 
law was in danger of being lost. More important still, judicial 
review, advocated as a means for securing a government of law, was 
said to be actually incompatible with that principle. Not only 
did it create a government of a selected few-the judges-but, by 
making the validity of a law dependent upon the sanction of the 
courts, it created a distrust in all acts of the non-judicial branches 
of government. The result was not a state of the government of 
law, but a state of anarchy.83 
78 "L'inconstitutionnalite des lois et le droit public £ran~," 126 REvuE POLITIQUE 
ET PARLEMENTAIRE 181 at 222 (1926). 
70 CHARMONT, LA RENAISSANCE DU DROIT NATUREL 189 (1910). 
so Lambert, "Quatre annees d'exercice du controle de la constitutionnalite des lois 
par la Cour supreme des Etats•Unis," MELANGES HAURIOU 467ff. (1929). 
81Letter to Morstein-Marx of Feb. 26, 1954. Quoted in MoRSTEIN-MARX, VARIATIONEN 
-OBER RICHTERLICHE ZUSTAENDIGKEIT ZUR PRUEliUNG DER REcliTMAESSlGKEIT DES GESETZES 32-33 
(1927). 
82 See Louis LeFur's review of E. Lambert, "Le gouvemement des juges et la Jutte 
contre la legislation sociale aux Etats-Unis" (1921), 39 REvuE DU DROIT PUBLIC 306 at 
313-314 (1922). 
83 See the opinions of Bluntschli and Laband, supra notes 71 and 72. Similar MEYER• 
ANSCHUETZ, I.EHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS, 7th ed., 740 (1919); KELSEN, ANNUAIRE 
DE L'INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PUBLIC 199 (1929). 
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Concluding it can be said that judicial review, although advo-
cated by many, was generally rejected in Europe prior to World 
War II. Historical, juristic and political reasons that were often 
connected accounted for the refusal of a doctrine which, although 
it had its roots in the Old World, became one of the central features 
of constitutionalism in the New World. In view of this tradition, 
the establishment of judicial review by the modern constitutions 
of Western Europe can be considered a revolutionary feat. Not 
only was judicial review accepted, but it also was given a scope that 
surpassed the hopes of its keenest advocates in the past decades. 
IV 
The introduction of judicial review in Europe after the Second 
World War was not accompanied by fundamentally new ideas on 
that institution. As a matter of fact, it appears doubtful if, in 
view of the extensive literature that had already come into exist-
ence, such ideas could be expected. Since the main arguments 
concerning judicial review were surveyed in the preceding pages, 
we shall now confine ourselves to a consideration of the actual 
organization and scope of judicial review in the postwar period. 
Judicial review appears to be weakest in France. Indeed, the 
question is justified whether it can be said to exist at all. Under 
Article 91 of the constitution, a Constitutional Committee 
(Comite Constitutionnel) shall "determine whether the laws passed 
by the National Assembly imply an amendment of the constitu-
tion." The Constitutional Committee is composed of the Presi-
dent of the Republic as the presiding officer, the presidents of the 
National Assembly and the Council of the Republic, seven mem-
bers elected by the National Assembly and three members elected 
by the Council of the Republic at the beginning of each annual 
session of these legislative bodies. The committee thus reflects 
the composition of the political and, especially, the legislative 
branches of government, and can hardly be expected to declare 
a national law void. 
Since the committee is authorized only to "determine whether 
the laws ... imply an amendment of the constitution," its func-
tion is restricted to reminding the legislature that a certain bill, 
in order to become law, will have to be passed with the majority 
required for constitutional amendment. The committee cannot 
strike down laws for being unconstitutional. This supervisory 
power is further decreased through the provision that no bill shall 
be examined for its compatibility with the preamble. Since the 
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individual's basic rights are guaranteed by the preamble, judicial 
review, as exercised by the Constitutional Committee, cannot be 
expected to be an institution for the protection of the individual. 
Also, the Constitutional Committee is liable to abolition by an 
ordinary statute without any possibility that the questioh of the 
constitutionality of such a statute could be raised. 
Finally, the committee examines laws only upon the joint 
request from the President of the Republic and the President of 
the Council of the Republic, the council having decided the matter 
by a majority of its members. In other words, questions of con-
stitutionality do not come to the committee upon appeal from in-
ferior ordinary or administrative courts. Therefore, since the 
committee is beyond the pale of the judicial hierarchy, doubts have 
been voiced as to whether it is a judicial body at all. 
Maspetiol is probably right when he states that the committee 
is a political rather than a judicial institution, because its "concilia-
tory functions have primacy over its strictly judicial functions."84 
The role the committee has played so far seems to support this 
statement. Nevertheless, it would go too far to deny that there 
exists some form of judicial review under the Fourth Republic. A 
beginning was made here that stands in contrast to the practice 
under the Third Republic. And although the probability that 
the Constitutional Committee will just reflect the views of the 
political departments is great, it cannot be taken for granted. 
Since the members of the committee who are elected by the two 
legislative chambers have to be jurists who are not members of 
the legislature, and since the President of the Republic is independ-
ent of the legislature, there exists the possibility that the com-
mittee might disagree with the legislative body. Besides, the 
donning of the robe is likely to temper the political prejudices 
of the members. Thus in spite of its restricted jurisdiction, the 
Constitutional Committee will in many cases be able to delay 
legislation that it considers incompatible with the constitution 
and make the amending power aware of the importance of the 
question at issue.85 • 
Under the Italian Constitution, judicial review exists in a 
84 Maspetiol, "Le problbne de la loi et ses developpements recents dans le droit 
public franr,;ais,'' ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS, CONSEIL D'ETAT 62 (1949). 
85 For judicial review in France after 1945, see l.EMASURIER, LA CoNsrmmoN DE 
1946 ET LE CoNTROLE JURIDICTIONNEL DU l.EGISLATEUR (1954), which contains a valuable 
bibliography; DUVERGER, MANUEL DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, 5th 
ed., 376-378 (1948); VEDEL, MANUEL ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CoNsrmJTIONNEL 551-556 
(1949); PRELOT, PRECIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 539-541 (1950); 3 BURDEAUX, ThAITE DE 
SCIENCE POLITIQUE 346ff. (1950). 
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stronger form than in France. The Constitutional Court (Corte 
Costituzionale) is composed of fifteen eminent jurists, one-third 
appointed by the President of the Republic, one-third by the legis-
lature, and one-third by the supreme ordinary and administra-
tive judicial bodies, for a term of twelve years. Since the judges' 
terms are staggered, the court is a continuing body which enjoys 
a certain independence of the political departments and is, with 
respect to its composition, not a mere reflection of these depart-
ments. Consequently, it could become an effective check upon 
the legislature. 
In contrast to its French counterpart, the Constitutional Court 
has the authority to judge "controversies concerning the constitu-
tional legality of the laws and the acts having the force of law, of 
the Italian State and the Regions" (Art. 134). Although some 
authors consider the court's right to review national laws as only 
incidental to its function to test regional laws in order to secure 
the unity of law in a regionalized nation, it admits of no doubt 
that the court can examine national laws for their constitutionality. 
Like in France, however, the exercise of judicial review is not 
likely to protect the individual from transgressions upon his rights 
by the political departments, since the constitution, while contain-
ing a bill of rights, leaves their restriction to the discretion of the 
legislature. 
The Constitutional Court examines laws upon the request of 
inferior courts. The question of the constitutionality of a national 
law can be raised by a litigant party or by the judge of the lower 
court itself. This procedure makes the Constitutional Court a 
truly judicial body of final appeal and assures the Italians of a 
more genuine judicial review than exists in France. As to the 
actual work of the court, no comment can yet be made, since the 
court was established only in December 1955, due to the fact that 
until then the political parties in parliament could not agree 
as to the five members who were to be appointed by them.86 
The system set up under the Bonn Basic Law is in many 
respects similar to that under the Italian constitution. The twenty-
four members of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesver-
fassungsgericht) are elected in equal numbers by the two legisla-
86For judicial review in postwar Italy, see 11 Arn DELL'AssEMBLEA CoSTITUENTE 
(Seduta de 31 gennaio 1948), 4336; LUCIFREDI, LA NUOVA COSTITUZIONE ITALIANA 197-205 
(1952); ESPOSITO, LA COSTITUZIONE ITALIANA 263-281 (1954). 
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tive chambers. Eight of the judges are selected from the high 
federal courts, and get the same tenure to which they were entitled 
there, i.e., as a rule, for life. The other sixteen members hold 
office for eight years. The. rule that only eight of the sixteen 
temporary members shall be elected at one time guarantees that 
the Federal Constitutional Court will, as a rule, be differently 
composed than the legislature. Thus the mode of election-
combining permanency with change-seems, together with the high 
qualifications for the judges, to provide for a court that can be 
an effective check upon the legislature. 
Like the Italian court, the Federal Constitutional Court has 
the right to test national laws for their constitutionality (Art. 93 
Basic Law). Since under the Basic Law civil rights are not subject 
to infringements by the political branches of the government, the 
court can be considered a stronghold for the individual's protec-
tion. 
This greater protection of the individual is also apparent in 
the procedure by which a constitutional problem is brought before 
the court. Whenever a lower court in a pending case doubts the 
constitutionality of a law pertinent to the adjudication of the case, 
the court must stay proceedings and refer the question of constitu-
tionality to the Federal Constitutional Court. Likewise a litigant 
who challenges the constitutionality of a law can, if the courts hold 
against him, after exhaustion of appeals, carry the case to the 
Federal Constitutional Court. This "constitutional complaint" 
(Verfassungsbeschwerde) can be launched by anyone who feels 
his rights infringed upon by the public authorities. The Federal 
Constitutional Court is thus a truly judicial body. As such it has, 
ever since its establishment in 1949, demonstrated its power vis-a-
vis the political departments and increased its prestige.87 
We may thus say that among the major continental nations, 
Germany has gone farthest in accepting and practicing judicial 
review. This is not surprising in view of the fact that judicial 
review had, in the days of the Weimar Republic, not only been 
advocated by theorists, but also exercised by the courts. In a re-
action to its denial under the Hitler regime, and the dictator's 
87 On judicial review in the Bonn Republic, see VON MANG0LDT, DAS BoNNER GRUND-
GESETZ, arts. 92-94 (1953), and the authorities cited there. GIESE, GRUNDGESETZ FUER nm 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 3d ed. (1953), gives a survey of the decisions of the Federal 
Constitutional Court (pp. 225-236). 
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distortion of the law, there was, after the war, a strong feeling in 
favor of the official recognition of judicial review. As a conse-
quence, it was provided for in the different state constitutions, 88 
and, in the postwar years, amply applied. Thus its acceptance by 
the framers of the Basic Law and its exercise by the Federal Con-
stitutional Court only brought to a conclusion a previous develop-
ment on the state level, for which the practice under the Weimar 
Republic had prepared the way. 
However, the courts expanded the scope of judicial review 
considerably. In the twenties, German judges had only dared to 
exercise the conventional form of judicial review, i.e., to test 
statutes for their compatibility with the written constitution. Now 
the courts went so far as to examine the validity of laws upon their 
compatibility with supra-legal norms and natural law and thus 
realized the dreams of the most daring advocates of judicial review 
during the previous decades. 
The expansion of the scope of judicial review did not remain 
restricted to the testing of statutes upon natural law. Once natural 
law concepts had been transmuted into some of the provisions of 
the new constitutions, the question arose whether the courts had 
the right to test other constitutional norms for their compatibility 
with those provisions. This implied the possibility of unconstitu-
tional constitutional norms. This possibility was admitted by dif-
ferent state courts89 and, later, by the Federal Constitutional 
Court.90 And although no constitutional provision was actually 
invalidated on the grounds of a conflict with superior constitu-
tional norms, the courts maintained that, in a given case, the judges 
would have the right to do so. A far-reaching expansion of judicial 
review indeed! 
88 See note 2 supra. 
89 Decisions of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof von Wiirttemberg-Baden of November l!I, 
1950, 32 DEUTSCHE RECHTS-ZEITSCHRIFT 566 (1950); of the Staatgerichtshof of Hesse of 
July 20, 1951; the Oberverwaltungsgericht Liineburg of March 3, 1950, 65 DEUTSCHES VER-
WALTUNGSBLATI 407 (1950); the Bavarian Verfassungsgerichtshof of June IO, 1949, 2 VER.-
WALTUNGS-RECHTSPRECHUNG No. 2 (1950); the Bavarian Verfassungsgerichtshof of April 4, 
1950, 2 VERWALTUNGS-RECHTSPRECHUNG No. 65 (1950); of March 14, 1951, 4 DIE OEFFENT-
LICHE VER.WALTUNG 471 (1951). 
90 Decision of December 18, 1953, 9 JURISTENZEITUNG 35 (1954). For a discussion of this 
decision, the decisions mentioned in the preceding note, and the problem of unconstitu-
tional constitutional norms, see the author's "Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms?" 
42 VA. L. REv. 1 (1956). 
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V 
The preceding pages have shown that the European nations 
have taken definite steps toward the institution of judicial review. 
However, it is also evident that the degree to which judicial review 
was established varies in France, Italy and Germany. This again 
seems to prove the old truism that law and legal practice are con-
servative and cannot escape their tradition. But it is also indica-
tive of a varying enthusiasm toward judicial review. By no means 
has the criticism of that institution, so prevalent during the past 
decades, ceased to exist. It"was evident in the conventions which 
framed the new constitutions, and could be noticed ever since.91 
This leaves us, then, to ask why the major continental powers have, 
since World War II, swung toward judicial review. 
Mere juristic-logical reasoning cannot supply an answer. · Ever 
since the fundamental juristic positions were taken in Marbury v. 
Madison and Eakin v. Raub, juristic arguments in favor of judicial 
review were convincingly answered by jurists who opposed judicial 
review. The futility of merely juristic argumentation was recog-
nized by Thoma as early as 1922, when he based his refutation of 
judicial review exclusively upon considerations of policy, by 
evaluating the different interests ( allseitige Interessenabwiigung).92 
The fact that Morstein-Marx, by using the same subjective method, 
arrived at an affirmation of judicial review,93 does not refute the 
fundamental soundness of Thoma's thesis. What, then, we have 
to ask, were the interests that brought about the recognition of 
judicial review? They were fundamentally those which before 
the Second World War made the majority of Europeans decide 
against it, and which may be identified by the term constitution-
alism. 
Constitutionalism may be defined as a condition under which 
the individual is protected from arbitrary government. As was 
shown, the Europeans' fight for constitutionalism was fought 
against cabinet justice for an increase of legislative power. Con-
stitutionalism meant the restriction of governmental power 
91 See notes 85-87 supra. 
G2 "Das richterliche Priifungsrecht," 43 A.RCHIV DES OEFFENlLICHEN RECHTS 267 (1922). 
Also in France, the discussion of judicial review turned, between the two wars, mainly on 
the question of whether its institution was advisable as a matter of good policy. See 3 
BURDEAU, TRAITE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 346-347 (1950) and the authorities cited there. 
OS V .AIUATIONEN, etc. 
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through the law. Law being restrictive of government for the 
sake of the individual, there was no reason or interest for testing 
it or curtailing the power of those who made it. However, by the 
end of the Second World War the law had lost to most Europeans 
its quality as a Magna Charta for the individual. Under juridical 
positivism, it had increasingly become an expression of state 
authority, until under the dictatorships it degenerated into a means 
for the suppression of the individual. As a result of this reversal 
people, rather than believing in a protection through the law, felt 
the need of a protection from the law, and came to accept judicial 
review. 
The establishment of judicial review can only in a restricted 
sense be considered a refutation of the continental tradition. With-
out any doubt, the practice of not examining legislative acts, 
hallowed through generations, had become a European tradition. 
But, since its purpose was only to guarantee constitutionalism, 
it was only complementary to and part of that more comprehensive 
tradition. When the law became the individual's oppressor rather 
than his liberator, and legislative supremacy therefore became 
destructive of constitutionalism, judicial review was introduced to 
preserve the tradition of constitutionalism. The means was 
changed in order to secure the end. 
The acceptance of judicial review as a means for the preserva-
tion of constitutionalism-defined as a condition under which the 
individual is protected from arbitrary government-has certain 
consequences for the scope of that institution. Clearly, the more 
judicial review is likely to protect the rights of the individual, 
the more it fulfills its purpose. Therefore, the exclusion of laws 
concerning civil rights from the testing function of the courts 
must result in a rather ineffective form of judicial review. The 
German constitution-makers were more aware of this than their 
French and Italian counterparts and provided for the judges' 
authority to test laws regulating basic rights. They went even 
farther. Realizing the danger inherent in the European practice 
of amending the constitution through a qualified majority of the 
legislative body, the constitutional provisions securing basic rights 
were exempted from the amending process and thus protected 
even from the amending power.04 This creation of superior and 
94 Art. 79 Basic Law; constitutions of Bavaria (1946) arL 98; Hesse (1946), art. 26; 
Rhineland-Palatinate (1947), arL 129 in connection with the preamble, arts. 1 and 74; 
Bremen (1947), art. 20; also, in a more indirect way, Baden (1947), art. 92 in connection 
with the preamble. 
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inferior constitutional norms expanded the scope of judicial review 
by subjecting to it constitutional norms and amendments. In a 
word, the individual was protected not only from the legislature 
in its capacity as ordinary lawmaker ( pouvoir constitue ), but also 
in its capacity as constitution-maker (pouvoir constituant). 
It appears doubtful whether any form of judicial review which 
is less comprehensive than the German can, in view of the increas-
ing power of the democratic majority, be considered an adequate 
means for the preservation of constitutionalism and the protection 
of the minority and the individual. As was pointed out else-
where, 95 the different scope of judicial review in the postwar con-
stitutions is largely due to the fact that the French and Italians 
were content with a revival of natural law concepts of the age of 
reason, whereas the Germans were also influenced by the older, 
aristotelian-scholastic concept of natural law. Aware of the short-
comings of the Weimar constitution that facilitated Hitler's rise 
to power, the Germans were more cautious in the acceptance of 
all that was made by a democratic constitution-maker who, after all, 
was human and, therefore, not infallible. As to the absence of the 
older natural law, dangerous similarities can, indeed, be noticed 
between the French and Italian constitutions and their counter-
parts in East Germany and the other people's democracies. Never-
theless, the steps taken by France and Italy toward judicial review 
stand in sharp contrast to those that were taken in Eastern Europe 
toward legislative supremacy and the exclusion of any form of 
judicial review. After a beginning has been made, judicial review 
may, in time, also in France and Italy become a true bulwark for 
the protection of the individual, and fulfill its purpose as a means 
for the continuation of constitutionalism. 
In the decades before the Second World War, the European 
nations were concerned with the question whether judicial re-
view should be established at all. Judicial review then had advo-
cates among theorists in France and Italy, whereas in Germany it 
was also exercised by the courts. Since 1945, each nation has 
advanced a step. France and Italy advanced from a theoretical 
advocacy toward the actual establishment of judicial review. 
Germany advanced from the exercise of conventional judicial 
review toward a judicial review that was oriented toward higher 
law and comprised the right to declare constitutional norms void. 
95 See the author's "Natural Law in the Modern European Constitutions," l NATURAL 
LAW FORUM 73 (1956). 
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Before the war, the advocates of judicial review, ranging from those 
who believed in natural law and unwritten law as a criterion for 
judicial review to those who were only willing to admit positive 
constitutional law for such a criterion, marshalled their small forces 
against those who rejected judicial review. Today, the former 
minority has become the majority. The question is no longer 
whether there should be judicial review, but rather, to which 
degree it should exist. From its traditional rejection of judicial 
review, Europe has, for the sake of constitutionalism, come a long 
way. 
